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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
dismissed the complaint; 41 the Appellate Division reversed; 42 and the Court of
Appeals in a four-three decision reversed the Appellate Division and held that
the complaint did not state a cause of action.43
In order for a publication to be actionable without proof of special
damages it must be libelous per se, i.e. it must on its face subject the plaintiff
to public aversion, contempt, hatred or disgrace, cause the public to form
unsavory opinion of plaintiff, or damage him in his trade or business.44 In-
nuendo pleaded in a libel complaint is merely for the purpose of explaining the
defamatory meaning which the plaintiff would give to the publication; it
cannot expand, extend or change a publication so as to give it a defamatory
meaning.45 In this case the Court split on the question of whether the publica-
tion was capable of an actionable meaning. It has been generally held that it
is for the court and not the jury to decide whether an admittedly published
statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. 46 If the court decides that the
publication is capable of a defamatory meaning and a non-defamatory meaning,
it is then for the jury to decide which meaning the publication actually im-
parted and in addition whether the publication related to the plaintiff.47
The majority in the Tracy case held that the publication in question was
incapable of any defamatory meaning. The dissenting minority on the other
hand, felt that it might be construed as defamatory and for that reason the
issue should have been submitted to the jury. It has been said of the judicial
function in this area-"A court, it is fundamental, should never take from a
jury doubtful questions of fact, but it is equally basic that a court shirks its
duty if it creates an issue where none exists." 48 It does not seem that a pub-
lication such as this, which on its face tends to rebutt the libelous meaning
urged in the innuendo, can be said to be libelous per se. The majority opinion
reached a wise result holding it was not, and thereby, denying plaintiff recovery
unless he could prove special damages.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION
On an appeal, testing the sufficiency of the complaint, a holding by the
41. - Misc.-, 160 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1957).
42. 5 A.D.2d 865, 171 N.Y.S. 2d 717 (1958).
43. Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., supra note 40.
44. Katopolis v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38 N.E.2d 112 (1941);
Nichols v. Item Publishers, 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860 (1956); Balabanoff v. Hearst
Consolidated Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945); Mencher v. Chesley,
297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
45. Fray v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 65 (1851) aff'd 6 N.Y. 209 (1852); Fleishmann v. Ben-
nett, 87 N.Y. 231 (1881); O'Connell v. The Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E.2d
556 (1915); Hayes v. American Defense Society, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929).
46. Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890); O'Connell v. The Press
Publishing Co., supra note 45.
47. Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398 (1871); First National Bank v. Winters, 225
N.Y. 47, 121 N.E. 459 (1918); Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 155
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
48. Crane v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 308 N.Y. 470, 479-480, 126 N.E.2d 753,
759 (1955).
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Special Term, 49 affirmed by the Appellate Division,"° that there is no liability
to the general public for negligently failing to provide police protection, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals, 51 in Shuster v. City of New York. 02 The
Court held that the public ". . . owes a special duty to use reasonable care
for the protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the arrest or
prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger
due to their collaboration."53
Shuster, whose death was the subject of this wrongful death action, had,
in response to publicized requests by the New York City Police Department,
supplied information leading to the arrest of Willie Sutton. Three weeks later,
Shuster, after having informed the police of the threats on his life due to his
collaboration, was shot and killed. The death was caused, contended the
plaintiff, by the failure of the police to provide special protection, thereby
recklessly exposing the deceased to danger.5 4
Although the courts have consistently held municipalities liable for negli-
gently performing their statutory duties where the malfeasance has resulted
in injury,55 they have steadfastly refused to impose liability for negligently
failing to perform their statutory duties.5" This refusal to impose liability is
generally based on the rationale that the statutory duties run to the public as
a whole, and not to the benefit of an individual.
In the instant case the Court was able to find that the deceased's act of
informing had been an act in response to his civic duty to aid in law enforce-
ment. The fulfillment of his duty created a reciprocal duty on the part of the
city to reasonably protect one who so assists. Although the dissenting opinions
rejected the existence of any legal duty to inform," the majority was able to
support its premise on the basis of section 1848 of the Penal Code of New
York.58 While this Section, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to aid a
policeman at his command, and provides absolute liability for injury to a
citizen while so assisting, is not directly applicable to this case, it does manifest
a recognition of some duty to aid in law enforcement as well as pointing the
49. 207 Misc. 2d 1102, 121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1953).
50. 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1955).
51. Dissenting opinions by Chief Judge Conway and Judges Desmond and Froessel.
52. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
53. Id. at 80, 81; 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269.
54. Two other causes of action, not here considered, rested on allegations of reliance
and misrepresentation, since the police had initially undertaken to provide special protection,
which was soon withdrawn, and conveyed to the deceased a false sense of security.
55. Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338 (1954); Lubelfeld v.
City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 176 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1958).
56. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Murrain v.
Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946), aff'd 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d
29 (1947); Rocco v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 1012, 126 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1953).
But see McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947); Meistinsky v.
City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1955), aff'd 309 N.Y. 998, 132
N.E.2d 900 (1956).
57. The dissent, although no reward was offered in the present case, considered the
offer of a reward as an inducement to inform rather than recognizing any duty to do so.
58. The Court also cited In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, (1895) which contained an
opinion regarding the rights and duties of a citizen to inform.
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finger of public policy in the direction of more, not less, care to those who so
assist the government. Further, the Court felt that the role of the Police
Department was far from passive, since they had not only requested aid, but
after having received it, acted on it, thereby establishing a special relationship
requiring further affirmative action.
In principle, this extension of municipal liability appears just. The in-
former, in shedding his protective cloak of public anonymity, exerts special
efforts in support of the public interest. It seems no more than proper to expect
special consideration for thus exposing himself to possible danger. The added
liability will prove a burden, but standards of reasonableness should prevent
the burden from becoming oppressive, and the burden may well become
illusory when considering the relative effects of encouraging further aid by the
citizen.
CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE BROKER OF REAL ESTATE COlMMISSIONS
The plaintiff in the case of Bereswill v. Yablon,59 on receiving his real
estate broker's license, succeeded to his brother-in-law's (one Thill) real estate
business, the latter having been contacted by Yablon to look into the purchase
of certain real estate owned by the Glennon Realty Corporation, without
revealing defendant's interest to Glenon. Thill was then employed by Glen-
non to provide a purchaser at the usual rate of commission. As a result of his
succession in interest, plaintiff then negotiated with Glennon who finally agreed
to a price of $90,000. Plaintiff quoted Yablon a price of $94,750 which in-
cluded his commission. Since this price was too high, negotiations between
plaintiff and defendant ceased. Thereupon Yablon formed the Esbar Realty
Corporation for the purpose of purchasing this land, with himself as the sole
stockholder. Shortly thereafter, Yablon, in the name of Esbar, purchased
the property for $92,000 through another broker, one Fisher. Fisher did
not know of plaintiff's previous efforts, neither did Glennon know that
Fisher was acting for the same principal as was the plaintiff. In the City
Court the plaintiff sued Esbar, Yablon and Fisher for conspiring to deprive
him of his commission. The Court there found for the plaintiff against all
defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed as to Yablon and Esbar but
reversed at to Fisher because of his lack of knowledge concerning plaintiff's
activities. On the defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff
sought to argue that the gravamen of his complaint was the depriving of the
plaintiff of his commission, the conspiracy language in the complaint serving
only to tie the acts of the defendants together.
The Court of Appeals viewing the case as it was considered below, i.e., one
of conspiracy, ruled that the complaint against Fisher was properly dismissed
for his lack of knowledge, and that the charge against Yablon and Esbar must
also be since after Fisher's dismissal, the only defendants remaining were the
Esbar Corporation and Yablon, its sole stockholder. Thus, a conspiracy be-
59. 6 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1959).
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